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ABSTRACT: 
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate if gender diversity has an impact on corporate economic 
performance and risk. Furthermore, the aim is to answer if there is an economic justification for the gender 
quota that the European commission has proposed. This paper contributes to the existing literature by 
comparing two countries Norway and Finland, which both have different method of improving gender 
diversity in the board room.  
 
The sample is gathered from Thomson Reuters Worldscope and the sample period is 2007-2016. Ordinary 
least square regression model is used to answer four main hypotheses. The dependent variables to 
investigate impact of gender diversity on economic performance are Return on Asset and Tobin’s Q and to 
investigate the impact of gender diversity on risk the dependent variables are Volatility and Debt to Asset 
ratio. Moreover, three diversity variables are chosen to act as a proxy for diversity, Percentage of women 
on board, Critical mass dummy and Blau index of diversity.  
 
The main findings of this paper are that, regressing the full sample, the percentage of women has a positive 
impact on risk and performance. There can be found indications that the critical mass might not be the most 
optimal amount of diversity for improving the accounting performance as the coefficient was found to be 
negative. Companies with more diverse boards were found to be riskier which is controversial to the 
literature.  
 
The results are highly country specific when two samples were regressed separately. For Finnish sample 
diversity has a positive impact on performance and risk but for Norwegian sample the findings are mainly 
negative. All in all, the main finding was that the results are country specific and there should not be a 
gender quota that mandates all the EU countries to have the same percentage of women on board.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Background for the topic 
  
In 2012, the European Commission started to take actions against the unequal 
representation of men and women on corporate boards. It proposed that legislative action 
should be taken, to increase women representation in the board room. The proposed 
solution to this was a gender quota which legislates every EU country to have at least 
40% women on their listed company boards (Commission Press Release 2012). This 
proposal was part of the EU’s 2020 program that has one of its objectives to increase 
equality between men and women (European Commission 2012).  
 
After the proposal, many arguments have been made for and against the quota and many 
have been discussing if this is only a social dilemma and does it have any economic base. 
Therefore, a lot of research have been made around the world to find the economic 
justification to increase women representation in the board room. Also, there has not been 
found any universal answer to the question that does equal representation of men and 
women have any impact on corporate performance.  
 
Even though many researches have been made from the topic of women and their impact 
on corporate economic performance, they mainly concentrate on one country or all listed 
companies in certain stock index. Furthermore, the methods wary and the variables are 
not the same in different research. Therefore, a question arises if these researches can be 
compared with each other and can we make a conclusion of the impact. Also, it is argued 
that the results of women having no impact on corporate economic performance might 
come from samples which have relatively low or high women representation (Reguera-
Alvardo, Fuentes & Laffarga 2017: 341). 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
1.2. Aim of the research 
 
The aim of this research is to see if there is a relationship between corporate economic 
performance and risk and board gender diversity. Also, the aim is to investigate if there 
is a difference between countries which have already gender quota in place, and which 
are using self-regulatory action.  
 
This research takes into consideration two countries between years 2007-2016, Norway 
which has already gender quota in place and Finland which is using self-regulatory 
actions to improve gender diversity. The samples are gathered from Thompson Reuters 
World Scope database and the research will evaluate the performance from the accounting 
and market perspective as well as from economic performance and risk perspective.  
 
This paper contributes to already existing literature by introducing two countries in the 
same research with different actions in place to tackle gender diversity. To my knowledge 
there is no research conducted to compare two countries with different legislation. The 
already existing research mainly focuses on all the countries in certain stock exchange or 
a specific country. Furthermore, research studying the risk and gender diversity is limited, 
which is why this paper will contribute to the literature by studying the relationship to 
risk as well.  
 
 
1.3. Structure of the paper  
 
The structure of this paper is as following. First the board of directors will be introduced, 
and the concept of gender quota will be discussed. After the introduction, the countries 
that will be researched in this paper shall be described. Secondly, the different schools of 
thoughts related to board of directors’ composition shall be discussed and analyzed in 
relation to the gender diversity. Following, the introduction of the scholars and papers 
that have studied the same topic. Thirdly, the data and method are discussed, and the 
summary statistics will be described. This paper will end with the empirical results and 
conclusion of the analysis.   
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2. BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND GENDER QUOTA 
 
In this part of the paper the main role of the board of directors will be introduced and the 
importance of the board of directors is stressed. After introduction, the ways of selecting 
gender diverse board shall be illustrated and gender quota in the EU countries is 
introduced and the concept of gender diversity is analyzing from the social side. Lastly, 
this section will introduce the countries that are taken into consideration in this research.  
 
 
2.1. Board of directors and their main role in a company  
 
Directors are people who have extensive pool of knowledge to govern and monitor the 
management. They have to operate between firm management and shareholders and grant 
the wishes of the shareholders (Hillman & Dalziel 2003: 384). In orders for these wishes 
to be granted board of directors have to communicate frequently with the management 
and delegate the authority to them.  
 
 
Figure 1. The Role of Board of Directors.  
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the picture of board of directors being in the middle of the shareholders 
and managers. In short, the responsibly of the shareholders is to elect the board of 
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directors and the board of directors elect the managers. This chain of command insures 
that the company is working according to shareholders best interest. The chain goes other 
way around as well, as the managers are given the authority to lead the company in daily 
bases. Managers reports their activities to board of directors to which they are liable to 
and the directors report these activities to shareholders to which they are liable to.  
 
Boland and Hofstrand (2009: 1-2) state that the main responsibilities of the board of 
directors are the following:  
 
1. Recruiting, supervising, retraining and compensating the managers. 
2. Providing direction for the company. 
3. Establishing a policy-based governance system. 
4. Governing the organization and the relationship with the CEO. 
5. Protecting the organization´s assets and member´s investments.  
6. Monitoring and controlling function.  
 
All these points require a lot of knowledge from the business industry and leading skills. 
They are also, demanding tasks if you do not have the necessary skills to tackle these 
points. Therefore, it is important that the board is elected based on their skills and merits. 
Later in this part the different theoretical schools of thoughts concerning the importance 
of the board of directors are introduced based on point of view of gender diversity. 
 
 
2.2. Link between women on board and firm value and glass ceiling 
 
The link between firm economic performance and gender diversity is illustrated in Figure 
2. There are three triggers to add more women on corporate board. First is by merits, 
second is by self-regulatory actions and third is by legislative actions. All these three 
triggers will be introduced and the link to the firm performance.  
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Figure 2. Link between women and firm value. 
 
 
The first trigger to gender diversity is the merits of appointed women and men. They are 
elected by the shareholders because they believe that these appointed people can ensure 
the best performing board. By creating the panel of board of directors like this the 
selection of the genders is random. However, it cannot be ensured that there is equal 
amount of both genders in the selection list and the selection might be based on the “Old 
Boys’ Club” where all the considered board members are men.  
 
The second trigger for appointing both genders is self-regulation which can be a part of 
the countries Corporate Governance Core. For example, there are regulations based on 
“Comply or explain” idea that if you do not have both gender in the board of directors 
you should explain why the targets were not met. These self-regulatory actions are taken 
in countries such as Finland, Austria and Denmark (Adams & Kirchmaier 2013: 2).  
 
Third and final trigger to increase gender diversity in the boardroom is by legislative 
actions. These actions are the ones that the EU has requested and the first country to adopt 
gender quota is Norway. Other countries such as Spain and Italy have followed Norway’s 
example (Adams & Kirchmaier 2013: 2). These gender quotas have been directed to listed 
companies and their board of directors and the optimal per centage of women on board 
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has been se to 40% (Reguera-Alvardo, de Fuentes & Laffarga 2017: 337, Adams & 
Ferreira 2009: 292, Rose 2007: 405).  
 
This gender quota phenomenon has first been merely a social dilemma to improve gender 
diversity and equality between men and women. According to EU action plan 2017-2019, 
men are more often appointed to managerial position than women and less than 5% of 
CEO’s are women (European Commission 2017: 1). One of the most used term to 
describe the difficulties for women to get to managerial positions is Glass Ceiling 
(Brunding and Cadigan 2014: 18). According to European Commission and other 
scholars, men and women do not have the same opportunities and pay (European 
Commission 2017: 2, Keloharju, Knüpfer & Tåg 2016). It has been argued that there is 
an invisible barrier which disables women to advance after a certain point and after the 
point has been reached the advancing is much harder compared to men (Caril & Egly 
2001:630). In order to tackle this barrier a quota legislation was introduced in 2012.  
 
The difficulty to appoint more women to board of directors comes from the fact that there 
are not enough qualified women to appoint. For example, in Spain the women appointed 
after the quota are much younger and have less work experience (Ahern & Dittmar 2012). 
However, these women might be more educated (Terjesen & Sealy 2016: 19) but clearly 
lacking the work experience compared to men. These women might not have been added 
to the board of directors without the gender quota. For institutions to justify legislative 
actions relationship between diverse board and firm performance has been examined. Still 
there is no universal answer to justify gender quotas.  
 
When it comes to firm performance and diversity on board, scholars have found the 
following relationship. Gender diverse board could produce better understanding of the 
industry, increase creativity and innovation, and improve problem solving and decision 
making (Gordini & Rancati 2017: 79). Furthermore, women behave differently than men 
and by more diverse boards have less attendance problems (Adams & Ferreira 2009). 
When board of directors are operating more efficiently due to all these traits the company 
might also perform better. Different findings from scholars will be introduced later in this 
paper.  
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2.3. Gender quota in the EU countries 
 
European commission started to talk about gender quota and legislation in 2012, when it 
started the EU’s 2020 program to tackle unequal representation of men and women in 
corporate boards. The initial intention was to improve gender equality and decrease the 
gender pay gap (European Commission 2017: 1). For EU to get quick actions, it proposed 
a gender quota to increase the number of women on corporate boards. In this paper gender 
quota is perceived as a certain number of women on corporate board and in fact European 
Commission has stated the amount to be 40% (Commission Press Release 2012). 
Furthermore, the quota was created to address the phenomena of critical mass which 
consists of the minority of the group and for the minority to influence the group they must 
fulfill at least 30 - 40% of the seats within a group (Dahlerup 2009). The theory will be 
introduced later in this paper.  
 
Even though EU has not made a quota legislation yet, the quota has been adopted by 
many EU countries, for example by Norway, Spain, France, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Croatia (Women Citizens for Constitutional Reform 2017). These countries have taken 
legislative actions to improve gender diversity, however the consequences may not be as 
positive as the intention. According to Linnainmaa and Horttanainen (2015: 26) the 
number of listed companies have decreased due to the women quota and in Norway the 
number of publicly listed companies has decreased from 600 to 300. It might be that the 
radical drop in public companies is caused by the fact that companies try to choose the 
best people on board based on their merits and skills. If the quota is one of the criteria for 
appointing a director, it might not be the best interest of the company to continue as a 
publicly listed company.  
 
When the increasing number of women seats on board of directors is inorganic the 
phenomena may lead to overemploying these few women who have the skills to act as 
board of director (Linnanmaa and Horttanainen 2015: 26). Furthermore, women are given 
preference over men and electing board members based on gender is not democratic 
(Dahlerup 2009). Even though scholars are debating for and agents the legislative quota 
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the European Commission has set a clear target to for improving the gender equality in 
the future.  
 
 
2.4. Social side of gender diversity 
 
There are many social arguments for and agents the diverse boards. However, most of the 
literature addresses the issue positively or neutrally. Overall gender diversity is 
considered to be a social phenomenon as we are addressing an issue with women not 
getting the same positions as men. Lückerath-Roovers (2013: 495) argues that society 
thinks diversity as a positive factor which will improve company’s reputation, if a high 
degree of diversity is established. However, a high level of gender diversity has not been 
established in many countries.  
 
Diversity can be associated with imaginative companies, but if women are elected based 
on gender, they may not bring the same value to the board (Campbell & Mínquez-Vera 
2008: 444). On the other hand, if women are hired based on their merits, they can bring 
different perspectives and ideas to the company (Adams & Ferreira 2009: 305). 
Furthermore, they are better at monitoring CEO’s, involved in strategies (Post & Byron 
2015) and they increase the participation rate in the meetings (Adams &Ferreira 2009: 
297). These arguments indicate that a gender diverse board could be a positive thing for 
a company and it could bring a better working board of directors. According to Singh and 
Vinnicombe (2014: 480) women bring more innovative, modern and transparent 
companies because they might have more imaginative solutions as they have more 
knowledge of the female customers. Therefore, if a company is diverse it might have 
better solutions to problems as well as more different points of view. On a social point of 
view gender diversity could bring something extra to corporate boards, however only 
social arguments do not justify the gender quota. 
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2.5. Introducing countries from this research 
 
The aim of this research is to see if there is a relationship between corporate economic 
performance and board gender diversity. Also, the aim is to investigate if there is a 
difference between countries which have already gender quota in place, and which are 
using self-regulatory action. This paper contributes to already existing literature by 
introducing two countries in the same research with different actions in place to tackle 
gender diversity. To my knowledge there is no research conducted to compare two 
countries. The research mainly focuses on all the countries in certain stock exchange or a 
specific country. Furthermore, Norway is one of the most gender diverse countries in the 
world which is why it makes it a good country to evaluate the effect of the quota.  
 
First country to be introduced is Norway. This country is chosen to this research because 
it is the first country to implement the gender quota. Also, there is a lot of research to be 
found concerning Norwegian companies and the gender quota (Ahren & Dittmar 2012, 
Wang & Kelan 2012). The impact of Norwegian quota has been affecting from 2003 so 
there is a lot of post-quota data.  
 
The second country to be introduced is Finland. Finland is one of the countries which has 
introduced self-regulatory actions and all Finnish government owned companies should 
have at least 40% women on their board of directors. This country is a great comparison 
to Norway as it has increased its women directors to 27% (Linnainmaa and Turunen 201: 
8) and it is nearly the amount that is stated to be the “critical mass” of the minority which 
has an effect on the population (Joecks, Pull and Vetter 2013: 61).  Finland is placed third 
in the Global Gender Gap Report (2017: 10) and a good comparison to Norway as it is 
already gender diverse and the diversity be seen natural in Finnish companies. This is 
why these two countries are an interesting comparison. 
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2.5.1. Introducing the corporate governance code of Norway 
  
Today Norway is considered to be the second most gender equal country in the world 
according to 2017 Global Gender Gap Report (2017: 10). It might be argued that this 
merit is due to the actions that Norwegian government took to tackle gender inequality. 
Norwegian parliament passed a law in 2003 which commanded all the publicly listed 
companies to have at least 40% female on their board of directors. The deadline for the 
reform was on July 2005 but the intention was failed, and women held only 9% of the 
seats. After the government noticed that the voluntary measures were not working it 
passed in 2006 a new demand that if the companies did not comply by 2008 it would be 
forced to dissolve. By 2008 all the listed companies followed the quota and Norway 
became the first country to adopt the gender quota. (Ahren & Dittmar 2012: 138).  
 
Norwegian listed companies are divided by Private limited liability companies and Public 
limited liability companies (Andersen, Sandanger & Muggerud 2013). The main 
difference between these companies is that in public limited liability companies the 
number of employees is much higher (200) than in public ones. Also, the members of 
board of directors are elected 2/3 by the shareholders and 1/3 by the employees. The 
gender quota law was built to affect only the public limited liability companies. 
(Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2014: 31; Ahren & Dittmar 2012: 144). There 
is not recommended board size for listed companies however, the minimum number of 
directors is three (Andersen et al. 2013). According to Ahren and Dittmar (2012: 145) the 
average Norwegian board size is five to six members.  
 
 
2.5.2. Introducing the corporate governance code of Finland  
 
Finland is considered to be a country in which men and women have equal rights in 
politics, education, work and business (Virtanen 2012: 572) and Finland placed third in 
2017 Global Gender Gap Report (2017: 10) which means that the country has low gender 
gap between men and women compared to other countries in the world. In Finnish 
working environment women possess only 27% of all board seats of Finnish listed 
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companies in 2017 (Linnainmaa and Turunen 201: 8), which is relatively high taken into 
consideration Finnish self-regulation concerning women on boards. In 2004 Finnish 
government started a gender diversity program which regulated all government owned 
companies to have at least 40% of the director seats to be fulfilled by women and these 
goals were reached in 2006 (Linnainmaa and Turunen 2014: 6). Furthermore, an addition 
has been made to Finnish Corporate Governance Code concerning women directors. This 
recommendation states that every Finnish listed company should have at least one woman 
in its board of directors (Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015: 5). 
 
Finnish Corporate Governance code 2015 (2015:13) has stated that there are three to ten 
members in Finnish listed companies and the board size varies. Most of the listed 
companies have adopted the one-tire governance model, where there is only one body of 
directors and the control committee is appointed from the board of directors. Only few 
listed companies in Finland have two-tire system in which the supervisory board is 
separated from the management board (Virtanen 2012, 579) even though two-tier system 
is allowed. Also, almost all members of the board in Finland are non-executive 
(Linnainmaa and Turunen 2014, 7). 
 
The share of women directors has grown annually in Finland. Only 9 companies have 
fully men dominant board of directors and two companies have 50% men and 50% 
women board members (Linnainmaa & Turunen 2017: 10). Even though the number of 
women directors has grown, still women are the minority in the board room. A 
recommendation was added to Finnish Corporate Governance code in 2015 that “the 
company shall establish principles concerning the diversity of the board of directors” 
(Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015). This recommendation requires companies 
to report objectives relating to both genders being represented in board of directors as 
well as means how to achieve these objectives (Linnainmaa & Turunen 2017: 7). These 
recommendations have shown to be quite effective and Finland is one of the countries 
which has the most gender diverse boards in the Europe (Isidro and Sobral 2015, 9). 
 
Without any legislations Finland has improved its gender diverse boards annually 
(Linnainmaa and Turunen 2015, 8) which is why it can be argued that the self- regulation 
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works in the case of Finland. However, nearly all Finnish listed companies have male 
majority which is why women may be seen as tokens. Especially in boards which have 
only one female and more than 60% men. In these situations, it may be that women cannot 
get their ideas into practice and is only following the lead of the majority. Then there is 
no significant correlation between women and corporate economic performance. This 
means that there is no difference if there is man or a woman filling this one board seat 
(Campbell and Minquez-Vera 2008, 444). However, if there is a significant relationship 
between board diversity and corporate economic performance it may be said that even 
small percentage of diversity can make a small difference. 
22 
 
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND MAIN LITERATURE 
 
In this section different theoretical school of thoughts will be introduced. At company 
level, agency theory and resource dependency theory are introduced. Furthermore, to 
tackle the individual level this section tackles human capital theory, tokenism and risk 
behavior. These corporate governance topics are discussed in terms of diversity among 
board of directors and how these theories will contribute to the idea of diversity.  In the 
end of this part different findings from gender diversity and firm performance and risk 
literature will be introduced.  
 
 
3.1. Agency theory and gender diversity  
 
Agency theory is considering the relationship between the agent (manager) and principal 
(shareholder). When the ownership of the company and control of the company is 
separated an agency cost may arise (Fama & Jensen 1983:304). How can we make sure 
that the agent works in the best interest of the principal? In this situation the board of 
directors creates a link between the agent and the principal. The duty of the board of 
directors is to act between the shareholders and the managers of a company. The board 
has to monitor the action of the managers in order to ensure the best interest of the 
shareholders. It has to deliver the wishes of the shareholders into actions and to guide the 
managers to lead the company to the right direction.  
 
According to the literature the agency cost can be minimized by good governance 
structure and efficient flow of information (Reguera-Alvardo et al. 2017:339). Board 
monitoring can reduce the agency cost as the board tries to deliver shareholders wishes 
and to control that the management is not working for only its best interest. If the board 
of directors succeed in monitoring and informing the managers, it can improve company’s 
performance (Fama 1980). The board of directors are operating as the information 
arbitrator between the shareholders and the management. Eisenhardt states that the 
information flow can be measured in terms of characteristics of the board. For example, 
the amount of board meetings, number of board committees, the amount of long-term 
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board members, diversity of board members and the different knowledge base of different 
industries of one individual board member. (Eisenhardt 1989:60). Therefore, it could be 
argued that, more diverse the company is, better the information flow and by better 
information flow and monitoring, the firm could perform better.  
 
When it comes to gender diversity, previous literature (Adams and Ferreira 2009:292; 
Post & Byron 2015:1559) has suggested that female directors are better at monitoring the 
managers and CEO’s. Also, they are more willing to keep sufficient information flow by 
making discussions, communicating with all the necessary parties and increasing the 
attendance in the board meetings (Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms 2016:527). Furthermore, 
more diverse boards could bring better operating and performing companies.  
 
 
3.2. Resource dependency theory and gender diversity  
 
Resource dependency theory is based on an idea that a company is dependent on its 
environment and in order for a company to survive it has to gather or link itself to the 
external resources (Terjesen, Sealy & Singh 2009: 323). The role of board of directors in 
this theory is to act with the outside environment to decrease the effect of the external 
environment to the company. The idea is to harness these resources as well as possible to 
succeed. The theory considers corporate boards as important link between the company 
and its environment and the outside resource on which the company is dependent on 
(Lückerath-Rovers 2013: 493) Also, an assumption is that companies that are better at dealing 
with environmental uncertainty and independence, can perform better (Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson, & Ellstrand 1999).  
 
Diversity in this theory is characterized as the knowledge about the industry, relationships 
with the industry and customers and the possibility to gather external finance for the 
company (Reguera-Alvardo et al. 2017: 339). Based on these characteristics, Regera-
Alvardo et al. (2017:339) suggests that increased diversity on board could benefit the 
performance of the company. Therefore, more diverse the board is, more knowledge it 
has concerning the environment. Based on Hillman´s analysis, companies that are 
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operating in industries that have a lot of female employees do also have female on their 
boards (Hillman 2007: 948). It might be that female directors can act as the link between 
the environment and the company. Furthermore, if the diversity and the directors which 
create links between other organizations and stakeholders is great enough, the company 
can manage its uncertain environment better (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978:145). In fact, more 
diverse board tend to be less risky (Jizi and Nehme 2012: 599), which might be due to the 
links and knowledge of the environment. 
 
 
3.3. Human capital theory and gender diversity  
 
Human capital theory is related to an argument that the resources are stored into 
individuals that are working in a company. Therefore, companies have to invest into 
people to gather these resources. In other words, human capital is the knowledge the 
person possesses, experience from previous jobs and skills that the person has mastered 
(Harris & Helfat 1997: 896-897). As the human capital is stored inside people, others 
cannot store it or use it the same way as the owner of the human capital does (Nguyen, 
Nguyen, Locke & Reddy 2017: 3). If this resource is stored inside a human, it could walk 
out of the building or a company damage it. Therefore, a company should invest into 
people to manage its human capital.  
 
If the company is dependent on its humans, then it should be highly important to have the 
right individuals in the board of directors to succeed in the business. Also, if the board of 
directors are the vessels to bring resources to a company then the board should contain as 
much human capital as possible. These individuals must have a lot of human capital stored 
inside them in order to be appointed as board of directors (Kanter 1988). According to 
Hillman, Cannella and Harris (2002) women tend to have less business background 
compare to men, they are more educated and join multiple boards at faster rates then men 
do. They could face discrimination in boards based on the lack of experience compared 
to men. Also, a question arises do these women have their position based solely on gender. 
On the other hand, women bring extra human capital to the board as they tend to be better 
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at networking and communicating (Hillman & Cannella 2007) with other companies and 
stakeholders.  
 
 
3.4. Critical mass theory and tokenism 
 
Critical mass theory suggests that when a certain rate (critical mass) is reached the effect 
of the subgroup (women on board) becomes clearer (Kramer, Konrad & Erkut 2006). 
However, when the certain rate is not reached the person with the specific trait that makes 
him/her the subgroup becomes a token. Tokens represent the whole demographic group 
within a bigger group and they may be seen as an example of the group (Lückerath-
Roovers 2013: 497). When the person (woman) is considered to represent the example of 
the whole demographic group (women) the opinions that the person (woman) shares with 
the bigger group (board of director men) are taken as the opinions of the demographic 
group (all the women) even though the opinions were not the subgroups opinions.  
 
When it comes to the diversity in the board room the tokenism arises. If only one woman 
is hired as director, she might bring new ideas and perspectives, however, she might end 
up as a token. This leads to a dilemma that her ideas are not listened, and she cannot bring 
any value to the board. According to Terjesen et al. (2009: 323) critical mass of three or 
more could “normalize” the situation, by making the gender issue no longer an issue. This 
would create an atmosphere where women can raise issues and feel more comfortable. 
Joecks, Pull and Vetter (2013: 61) also agree with the absolute number of at least 30% 
women on board. This is why in this study the critical mass of 30% is taken into 
consideration to control the effect of women on board.  
 
 
3.5. Risk behavior  
 
Many studies have tackled a question of do men and women act differently when it comes 
to risk. There is a well-known stereotype that men tend to take more risks than women 
(Siegrist, Cvetkovich & Gutscher 2002: 94) and it leads to an expectation that men seek 
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more risks compared to women (Powell & Ansic 1997). A research conducted by Mateos 
de Cabo, Gimeno and Nieto (2010) found out that banks which are less risky have more 
women on their boards. The authors conclude that these banks are more risk averse and 
that is why they are less risky (Mateos de Cabo et al. 2012: 157).  
 
The theory might be also extended to the company risk, when it comes to risk behavior, 
gender diversity. Companies that have more women on their boards should be risk averse 
and a board which is more diverse should act differently compared to homogeneous group 
(Adams & Funk 2012: 234). There has been evidence (Jizi & Nehme 2017: 559) that 
boards with more women have less volatile stock returns, which might be due to the 
critical mass of women and when there are enough people of certain gender the ideas and 
values can be interpreted to the practice.  
 
 
3.6. Findings from previous literature 
 
A growing amount of research has been conducted to examine the association between 
board gender diversity and firm’s economic performance. However, the literature has not 
found universal answer for this phenomenon. The scholars have been divided between 
those that have found positive relationship between gender diversity and corporate 
performance and those who have found no or negative relationship between these two. 
The extensive amount of interest towards this topic might be caused by the debate of 
justifying gender quota or justifying the reasons why it should not be implemented. The 
following table1 lists some of the research conducted of this topic. 
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Table 1. Overview of the literature 
 
Writer(s) 
Gender diversity 
measure 
(Independent 
variable) 
Performance 
measure 
(Dependent 
variable) 
Main result Country 
Erhard, Werbel 
& Shrader 2003 
Gender and ethnic ROA and ROI 
Relative higher 
board diversity 
leads to better 
performance in 
ROA 
USA 
Rose 2007 
Proportion of 
women on board 
Tobin’s Q 
There is no effect 
between women and 
performance 
Denmark 
Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera 
2008 
Percentage of 
women and 
dummy (at least 
one women) 
Tobin’s Q No effect by it self Spain 
Adams & 
Ferreira 2009 
Log sales, women 
on board, 
ROA and Tobin’s 
Q 
Female directors 
have a significant 
impact on board 
inputs and firm 
outcomes 
USA 
Ahern & 
Dittmar 2012 
Women on board Tobin’s Q 
Caused significant 
drop in stock price 
and decline on 
Tobin’s Q. Led to 
younger boards, 
increased leverage 
Norway 
Jizi & Nehme 
2012 
Women on board Volatility 
Women reduce 
stock return 
volatility 
UK 
Lückerath-
Rovers 2013 
Female per 
centage, female 
dummy 
ROA, ROE, ROS, 
EBIT, TSR 
Firms with women 
directors perform 
better 
The Netherlands 
Table 1 continues. 
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Table 1 continues. 
Writer(s) 
Gender diversity 
measure 
(Independent 
variable) 
Performance 
measure 
(Dependent 
variable) 
Main result Country 
Joecks, Pull & 
Vetter 2013 
Gender diversity ROE 
The effect of 
diversity is first 
negative and after 
the critical mass is 
establisher it starts 
to be positive 
Germany 
Solakoglu 2013 
Diversity (dummy 
more than one) 
ROA, ROI and 
average monthly 
return 
Industry matters 
when it comes to 
relationship 
between diversity 
and firm 
performance 
Turkey 
Chen, Ni & 
Tong  
2014 
Percentage of 
women 
Volatility 
Women improve 
efficiency of risk 
management 
USA 
Isidro & Sobral 
2014 
Women on board 
Firm value 
(Tobin’s Q), ROA, 
ROS financial 
performance 
Diversity does not 
have any impact on 
firm performance  
36 countries 
Post &Byron 
2015 
  
Female 
representation is 
positively related to 
firm performance. 
Many countries 
Gordini & 
Rancati 2017 
Female dummy (at 
least one), per 
centage of women, 
Blau-index, 
Shannon-index 
Tobin’s Q 
Blau and Shannon 
index have a 
positive and 
significant 
relationship with 
Tobin’s Q 
Italy 
Horak & Cui 
2017 
Companies with 
and without 
women 
Debt to asset 
Companies with 
women on board are 
less risky 
China 
Reguera-
Alvarado, 
Fuentes & 
Laffarga 2017 
Percentage of 
women and 
dummy (at least 
one women) and 
Blau-index 
Tobin’s Q 
More diverse boards 
perform better 
Spain 
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Women have been seen to bring positive effect on firms’ economic performance in the 
US (Adams & Ferreira 2009), Turkey (Solakoglu 2013), the Netherlands (Lückerath-
Rovers 2013) and in Italy (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader 2003). In these countries, 
researchers have found a positive relationship especially with the accounting measures 
Return on Asset and Return on Equity. In contrast, negative effect has been found in 
Germany (Joecks et al. 2013), Denmark (Rose 2007) and no effect in Spain (Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera 2008). This part will introduce the different findings of the research and 
the methods how the research has been conducted. The following sections are divided 
between positive findings and negative and no findings parts.  
 
 
3.6.1. Women have a positive impact  
 
According to Jizi and Nehme (2012: 599) companies with more diverse boards, tend to 
have less stock volatility however, for some industries the effect is more favorable than 
to others. They argue (2012: 599) that for most of the industries female representation 
was not favorable, but especially for consumer goods and services, health care and utility 
firms the relationship was favorable. The findings are different when we look at the 
economic performance. According to Solakoglu (2013: 1565) diversity has different 
effect on corporate economic performance when the industry changes. Especially firms 
operating in manufacturing industry tend to perform better if the board of directors are 
diverse (Solakoglu 2013: 1565).  
 
A positive relationship between gender diversity and firm’s performance has been found 
from Spanish data and US data as well (Reguera-Alvardo et al. 2017: 347, Adams & 
Ferreira 2009). Adams and Ferreira with their S&P 500 sample, (2009: 308) argue that 
there is a value adding and significant effect on corporate board when it is diverse. On 
the other hand, there is no relationship to be found if the board is not motivated to add 
more diverse members into the group. If the motivation is merely inorganic the 
relationship might be different. (Adams & Ferreira 2009:308). Moreover, a positive 
relationship with gender diversity has been found especially with the accounting 
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measures (Post & Byron 2015, Adams & Ferreira 2009, Lückerath-Rovers 2013: 506). 
Meta-analysis conducted from 140 studies (Post & Byron 2015) found out that most of 
the positive and significant relationships could be found from Return on Asset and Return 
on Equity measures. Meanwhile, the relationship between market performance and 
diversity was nearly non-existing (Post & Byron 2015) or negative (Lückerath-Rovers 
2013: 506).  
 
From the research that has found gender diversity to have a relationship with firm´s 
performance justify these findings by saying that diversity brings greater variety of 
knowledge, experience and relationships to companies (Lucas-Pérez, Mínquez-Vera, 
Baixauli-Soler, Martín-Ugedo& Sámchez-Marín 2015: 269). They have less experience 
for being a director, but they compensate this by adding value in public relations, legal 
field and marketing communication (Hillman et al. 2002: 758). This is why, gender 
diverse boards add more value to the company and the relationship between diversity and 
performance might be found.  
 
Most of the studies which found a positive relationship between gender diversity and 
firm’s economic performance used ordinary least square regression method to determine 
the relationship (Adams & Ferreira 2009, Lückerath-Rovers 2013, Reguera-Alvardo & 
Laffaga 2015). Furthermore, most used indicators for firm’s economic performance are 
ROA, ROE, ROI and Tobin’s Q (Adams & Ferreira 2009, Lückerath-Rovers 2013, 
Reguera-Alvardo et al. 2017, Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader 2003). As mentioned earlier the 
positive relationships could be found for accounting measures from nearly all of the 
studies but market measures such as total shareholder return (TSR) was not found to be 
related to gender diversity. It might be a good idea to enhance these market measures to 
diversity research. The variables used in this paper will be introduced later.  
 
 
3.6.2. Women have a negative or no impact   
 
A lot of positive findings have been made in the field of research, in the meantime 
Lückerath-Rovers (2013: 507) argue that women cannot have a direct impact on firm’s 
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economic performance. She stresses that even though a weak correlation has been found 
between gender diversity and accounting measures, it is not enough to justify that by 
simply adding women on board would improve firm’s performance. Some evidence has 
been found that there is so called “critical mass” which has to be reached in order for 
diversity to have an effect on a company. According to Joecks et al. (2013) with their 
sample of German listed companies, number of women has to be at least 30% of the whole 
population of director for them to have any significant relationship with firm’s economic 
performance. If this number is not fulfilled, women will be seen as mere tokens and do 
not add value to the board.  Joecks et al. (2013: 68) argue that the relationship between 
diversity and Return on Equity is considered to be U-shaped. When the diversity in less 
than 30% women, the relationship between gender diversity and ROE is negative or non-
existing. But when the diversity in more than 30% women can have a positive relationship 
with ROE. Therefore, it might be argued that the number of women on board should be 
considered when a quota is established. However, it is also argued that the “right” balance 
between men and women constitutes a more effective board and the critical mass does 
not matter (Gordini & Rancati 2017: 87).  
 
Ahren and Dittmar (2012) came to conclusion with their Norwegian listed company 
sample, that adding more women into corporate board dropped company stock price and 
decreased Tobin’s Q substantially. Their research focused on the point of time when 
Norway implemented the gender quota and they argue that companies choose their board 
of directors to maximize shareholder value (Ahrem &Dittmar 2012: 188). In this paper, 
by adding women based on their gender did not lead to immediate success. This is why, 
they stress that regulatory quota might not be the best possible solution to improve gender 
diversity (Ahrem & Dittmar 2012: 189). 
 
Similar findings were made by Rose (2007), who stresses that in Denmark the relationship 
between gender diversity and economic performance was not statistically significant. In 
other words, the diversity and Tobin’s Q were not linked. Even though the same ordinary 
least square regression and nearly all the same variables were used, this the coefficient 
was found to be negative and not significant. Therefore, some conclusions might be drawn 
that these results could be country related.  
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When it comes to risk and gender diversity Horak & Cui (2017: 859) stress that in firms 
which have more diversity on their boards, the debt to asset ratio is lower. This means 
that companies in Chinese markets are less risky and leveraged when both men and 
women are represented on board of directors. The same findings were made by Chen, Ni 
and Tong (2014) who were argue that female directors improve board operations in risk 
management which might lead to less risky companies. All in all, the findings might be 
different when we take into consideration the economic performance and risk. However, 
a common finding is that most of the literature have found some evidence that there is a 
relationship.  
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4. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
There is a clear gap in the existing literature when it comes to comparing two countries 
and their gender equality on board if directors. Moreover, as there are many countries 
which have already adapted gender quota and those which practice self-regulation in 
gender equality it is essential to know if these companies in these countries differ in 
economic performance. This is why this paper will have two samples, one from Norway 
which uses gender quota and one from Finland which uses self-regulatory actions. The 
aim of this research is to see if there is a relationship between corporate economic 
performance and board gender diversity. Also, the aim is to investigate if there is a 
difference between countries which have already gender quota in place and which are 
using self-regulatory action.  
 
Based on the previous literature, economic performance has been mainly measured by 
Return on Asset (ROA). Most of the papers have got a positive relationship between ROA 
and gender diversity and the researchers have pointed out that the positive relationship 
can be found from accounting measures. (Adams & Ferreira 2009, Erhard, Werbel & 
Shrader 2003, Isidro & Sobral 2014, Lückerath-Rovers 2013). Therefore, the hypothesis 
one is as following: 
 
H1: There is a positive and statistically significant relationship with accounting 
performance and gender diversity.  
 
To investigate the market performance and the impact of the diversity to it, the previous 
research has used Tobin’s Q. According to previous findings the impact varies between 
positive, negative and no impact. However, most of the results suggest that there is no 
impact found (see Table 1). (Ahren & Duttmar 2012, Campbell & Minguez-Vera 2008, 
Gordini & Rancati 2017). This is why the hypothesis two is as following:  
 
H2: There is no statistically significant impact between market performance and gender 
diversity.  
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The existing literature is mainly focused on the market and accounting performance as 
mentioned earlier. This is why this paper will contribute to the existing literature by 
adding a risk factor which will measure the riskiness and volatility of the company. Jizi 
and Nehme (2010) argued that companies which have more women on their board would 
be less risky and volatile. According to the theoretical schools of thoughts companies 
which have more diverse boards should have more knowledge of the industry, 
relationship with the industry and customers (Reguera-Alvardo, Fuentes & Laffarga 
2017: 339). Because of these factors the company should understand its environment and 
manage the challenges better, and the risk might also be smaller or more stable compared 
to less diverse companies. The risk and volatility will be measured by the standard 
deviation of the yearly stock return. 
 
H3: Diversity has a degreasing impact on volatility and risk. 
 
In order for the analysis to be balanced a fourth and last hypothesis will contribute to the 
literature by analyzing the debt risk of the company. According to the literature, diverse 
boards should be less risky when it comes to debt risk (Horak & Cui 2017: 859). 
Furthermore, women should be more risk averse then men (Mateos de Cabo et al. 2012: 
157), which might balance the risk taking related to debt.  
 
H4: Diversity has a decreasing impact on debt risk.  
 
This paper contributes to already existing literature by introducing two countries in the 
same research with different actions in place to tackle gender diversity. To my knowledge 
there is no research conducted to compare two countries. The research mainly focuses on 
all the countries in certain stock exchange or a specific country. Furthermore, the two data 
panels will be regressed together first to see the impact of gender diversity and after this 
the two different panels will be regressed separately as a robustness test. After the 
hypothesis have been studied from both Norwegian and Finnish samples, the results will 
be evaluated statistically if the result could be compared and some conclusions could be 
made based on the results and comparison.  
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5. DATA AND METODOLOGY 
 
In this section the data that is use in the paper will be introduced. Also, the reasoning for 
the variables shall be explained. After data description this section will continue with 
introducing the methods of the data analysis.  
 
 
5.1. Data description 
 
The research consists of panel data gathered from Thomson Reuters and Worldscope and 
Nasdaq database during years 2007-2016. This research takes into consideration OMX 
Helsinki’s and OMX Oslo’s listed companies from which all the necessary datapoints could 
be found.  
 
The following criteria was followed in data collection. The companies have to be listed 
in OMX Helsinki or OMX Oslo the whole period 2007-2016. All the variables and 
datapoints must be found from the companies that were selected to this study and the data 
has to be found from the annual reports of the companies, from Thomson Reuters and 
Worldscope database or from nardaqomxnordic.com website. All the financial companies are 
left out of the sample. All in all, the dataset consists of 35 companies and 350 observations 
from OMX Helsinki and of 19 companies and 16 observations from OMX Oslo.  
 
 
5.2. Methods  
 
In this research Ordinary Least Square regression is used to investigate if there is a 
relationship between gender diversity and company performance. The full sample is 
regressed first and after that the sample is split into Norwegian and Finnish samples as a 
robustness test. After the regression analysis has been conducted the results will be 
analysed. 
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5.2.1. Variable description 
 
The following variables (Table 2) were selected in order to tackle the research question. 
The selection was mainly done based on the previous literature. 
 
Table 2. Variable table 
Dependent variables Variable code 
Return on Asset ACC 
Tobin's Q MARK 
Volatility RISKM 
Debt to Asset Ratio RISKD 
Independent variables 
Percentage of women PERS 
Critical mass dummy MASS 
Blau index BLAU 
Control variables  
Debt to Asset ratio DEBT 
Board size BSIZE 
Firm size FSIZE 
Yearly volatility of OMX Helsinki 
20 PI index and OMX Oslo 20 PI 
index 
OMX 
LN Market value of the company VAULE 
Tobin’s Q TOBIN 
Industry dummy  
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As the first dependent variables the research uses Return on Asset which is one of the 
mostly used variable in the literature to measure the financial performance (Adams & 
Ferreira 2009, Erhard et al. 2003, Isidro & Sobral 2014, Lückerath-Rovers 2013). Return 
on Asset is calculated as following: 
 
(1)  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
 
 
As the second dependent variable, this research uses Tobin’s Q to measure the market 
performance of specific companies. The same variable has been used in the previous 
research as well (Ahren & Duttmar 2012, Campbell & Minguez-Vera 2008, Gordini & 
Rancati 2017) and the same method of measuring the variable is used as Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera (2008), Rose (2007) and Gordini and Rancati (2017) uses in their 
researches. It measures the market value of the firm and at the same time the market 
performance. Tobin’s Q is calculated as following:  
 
(2)   𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
 
 
Tobin’s Q indicates the market’s expectation of the future earnings and according to 
Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) it is a suitable proxy for company’s competitive 
advantage. According to Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008: 442) this measure offers a 
perfect measurement to evaluate firm’s performance as companies which have Tobin’s Q 
ratio greater than 1.0 are expected to create more value by effective use of resources. On 
the other hand, those companies that have Tobin’s Q ratio less than 1.0 are seen as poor 
users of resources. They also argue that Tobin’s Q applies as a risk measurement (2008: 
442). 
 
The third dependent variable is introduced to measure firm risk. The standard deviation 
of company stock return is used to act as a proxy of risk and volatility in the market 
(Adams &Ferreira 2009: 293). The yearly standard deviation is calculated from the 
monthly observations of each company’s stock price change.   
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In order for our sample to be balanced we will add the last dependent variable Debt to 
Asset ratio to measure the debt risk. Companies with higher debt to asset ratio are 
perceived as risky investments as they have to pay the debtors even if the company is not 
in a good financial health (Horak & Cui 2017: 858)   The ratio is calculated as following.  
 
(4)  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Women on board of directors is measured in three ways in this research and all of the 
gender variables are lagged by one period to avoid endogeneity problem (Moreno-Gmez, 
Lafuente & Vaillant 2017: 110, Greene 2003: 381). Firstly, the proportion of women on 
board is measured as the per centage. Secondly, the critical mass theory is observed by 
adding a dummy of 1 if there are 30% or more women on board and 0 if there are less 
than 30% women on board. Thirdly, the Blau index of diversity is used to measure 
heterogeneity of a group. This index is most commonly used index in diversity research 
(Solanas, Selvam, Navarro, Leiva 2012: 4) and more specifically in board gender 
diversity research (Reguera-Alvardo et al 2015, Campbell & Minguez-Vera 2008, Joecks 
et al. 2013). The index is calculated as following: 
 
(6)   𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑘
𝑖=1  
 
Where 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion of the group members in category i and k demonstrates the 
category for an attribute of interest. This means that the index will be computed 1 −
(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛2 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑒𝑛2) for every observation point.  
 
This research also includes number of control variables which are estimated to have an 
effect on the dependent variables. The first controllable variable is debt to asset ratio, 
which is most likely affecting the profitability of the company. The second control 
variable is board size measured as the number of board members. It is argued that the 
board size might increase due to legislative actions of increasing diversity (Adams & 
Ferreira 2009: 296) this would mean that women are simply added on the board and the 
old board dynamic continues.  
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The third control variable in this research is the firm size. It is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets and according to previous literature it is highly related to the 
performance of a company (Campbell & Minquez-Vera 2008: 441). In addition, it is 
commonly used control variable in this field of research (Adams & Ferreira 2009, Isidro 
& Sobral 2014, Luca-Perez et al. 2013). The fourth control variable is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the company, which is highly related to the risk of the 
company. The fifth control variables are standard deviations of OMX Helsinki PI index 
closing price and OMX Oslo 20 PI index closing price to discover the volatility of the 
stock markets. The yearly standard deviations are calculated from daily closing prices of 
the price index. To control Finnish and Norwegian markets separately the OMX Helsinki 
values will be interpreted to Finnish companies and OMX Oslo values will be interpreted 
to the Norwegian values.  
 
Lastly the industry effect and the year fixed effects are included to the model. The 
industry controls will be executed by adding dummy variables of 1 if the company 
belongs to the industry and 0 otherwise. This paper follows the Nasdaq’s 10 industry 
sector division (Nasdaq). The company fixed effect will not be used as all the companies 
belong to the same industry and if these two fixed effect controls were added to the same 
model there would be a collinearity problem. The year fixed effect is added by using 
Eview’s internally build period fixed effect function. 
 
 
5.3. Regression models 
 
This paper will conduct several regression models. The models will be constructed for all 
four dependent variables separately and to investigate the gender diversity in three 
different perspective (Models 1-3), all four dependent variables will be regressed in three 
different regression models.  
 
 
 
40 
 
5.3.1. Regression models 1-3 for accounting and market performance 
 
Model 1 will investigate if there is a relationship between percentage of women and 
performance of the company. The model will be as following: 
 
(7) 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 +
             𝛽5𝑂𝑀𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
Where, 
Y t  ACC, MARK 
PERS t-1 Percentage of women on board lagged one year 
DEBT t-1 Debt ratio lagged one year 
BSIZE t-1 Board size lagged one period 
FSIZE t-1 Firm size lagged one period 
OMX t-1 Volatility of OMXH and OMXO lagged one period 
DIND t Industry dummy 
 
The Model 2 is constructed to tackle the critical mass theory. A dummy variable was 
constructed to be 1 when the diversity is 30% or more and 0 if diversity is less than 30%. 
All the dependent variables will be regressed separately with the following regression 
model. 
 
(8) 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 +
             𝛽5𝑂𝑀𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
Where, 
Y t  ACC, MARK 
MASS t-1 Dummy of 1 when there are equal or more than 30% women and 0 if less, 
lagged one year 
DEBT t-1 Debt ratio lagged one year 
BSIZE t-1 Board size lagged one period 
FSIZE t-1 Firm size lagged one period 
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OMX t-1 Volatility of OMXH and OMXO lagged one period 
DIND t Industry dummy 
 
The Model 3 shall take into consideration the Balu index of diversity which measures the 
heterogeneity of a group and all the dependent variables will be regressed the following 
model.  
 
(9) 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐿𝐴𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 +
             𝛽5𝑂𝑀𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
Where, 
Y t  ACC, MARK 
BLAU t-1 Blau index lagged one year 
DEBT t-1 Debt ratio lagged one year 
BSIZE t-1 Board size lagged one period 
FSIZE t-1 Firm size lagged one period 
OMX t-1 Volatility of OMXH and OMXO lagged one period 
DIND t Industry dummy 
 
 
5.3.2. Regression models 1-3 for market and debt risk 
 
The model 1-3 for market risk and volatility will not lag the OMX variable as in the 
previous models as the optimal lag structure for OMX is without lags.   
 
(10) 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑀𝑋𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
Where, 
Y t  RISKM 
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DIV t-1 Model 1 Percentage of women lagged one year, Model 2 Dummy of 1 
when there are equal or more than 30% women and 0 if less, lagged one 
year and Model 3 Blau index lagged one year 
DEBT t-1 Debt ratio lagged one year 
BSIZE t-1 Board size lagged one period 
FSIZE t-1 Firm size lagged one period 
OMX t Volatility of OMXH and OMXO 
DIND t Industry dummy 
 
This models 1-3 for Debt risk will follow the same pattern as the pervious equation 10. 
However, the debt variable will not be taken as the independent variable and will be 
replaced by Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q has been argued to measure risk as well and this is why 
it might be related to the debt risk of the company (Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008: 
442). Also, the market value of the company is added to the regression as it is considered 
to be related to risk of a company. The equation looks as following: 
 
(11) 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑡−1+𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑀𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
Where, 
Y t  RISKD 
DIV t-1 Model 1 Percentage of women lagged one year, Model 2 Dummy of 1 
when there are equal or more than 30% women and 0 if less, lagged one 
year and Model 3 Blau index lagged one year 
TOBIN t-1 Tobin’s Q lagged one year 
BSIZE t-1 Board size lagged one period 
FSIZE t-1 Firm size lagged one period 
VALUE t-1 Market value of the company lagged one period 
OMX t Volatility of OMXH and OMXO 
DIND t Industry dummy 
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6. RESULTS  
 
In this section the results of the statistical analysis will be introduced. First this part will 
start with descriptive analysis and continue with the correlation matrix. The section will 
end with the regression analysis of the whole sample and the split sample.  
 
 
6.1. Descriptive analysis  
 
The Table 3 below illustrates the descriptive statistics of the sample. When we look at the 
percentage of women between 2007 and 2016, it seems that the diversity varies between 
66,67% and 0,00%. Also, the diversity index Blau varies between 0,5 and 0. This is quite 
dramatic variation and needs to be looked at more deeply. The average diversity in the 
sample is 31%, which is quite high compared to the minimum percentage of women on 
board.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 2007-2016. 
Descriptive statistics 
   Mean  Median  Maximum 
 
Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
ACC 6,95 6,52 27,76 -17,31 7,32 
MARK 1,64 1,44 5,99 0,63 0,77 
RISKM 0,33 0,30 1,37 0,10 0,18 
RISKD 0,26 0,24 0,91 0,00 0,16 
PERS 31,00 33,33 66,67 0,00 12,83 
MASS 0,57 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,50 
BLAU 0,39 0,44 0,50 0,00 0,11 
DEBT 0,26 0,24 0,91 0,00 0,16 
BSIZE 8,32 8,00 20,00 2,43 1,38 
FSIZE 16,22 15,82 21.70 13,09 0,85 
VALUE 8,87 8,68 12,43 5,97 1,51 
OMX 0,23 0,199 0,54 0,11 0,09 
Notes: This table lists the descriptive statistics where, ACC is ROA, MARK is Tobin’s Q, 
RISKM is stock volatility, RISKD is debt to asset ratio, PERS is percentage of women on 
board, MASS is critical mass dummy, BLAU is the diversity index, DEBT is debt ratio, 
BSIZE is the board size, FSIZE is natural logarithm of assets, VALUE is market value of a 
company,  OMX is the average yearly closing price of OMXH and OMXO. 
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The median board size on the other hand is 8,32 and if we look at the diversity percentage, 
we can see that on average, there are two to three women in median sized board. Taking 
the perspective of the critical mass theory and tokenism, this finding indicates that women 
should have an impact on the corporation as the amount is more than one in average sized 
boards.  
 
Table 4. Percentage of women on board 
Average percentage of women  
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Full 
Sample 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 29 29 30 
Finland 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 29 29 30 
Norway 26 27 29 30 33 33 34 33 35 36 
T 27 29 31 31 35 34 36 34 36 37 
C 25 27 29 31 35 34 35 34 34 36 
O 27 28 30 32 35 34 36 35 36 37 
M 29 29 31 30 34 33 34 33 36 36 
I 26 27 29 30 34 34 34 33 35 36 
H 28 28 34 28 28 27 29 25 27 34 
Notes: The table lists the average percentage of women from 2007-2016. Sample takes the whole sample 
into calculations, Finland takes only Finnish companies, Norway takes only Norwegian companies, T is 
the companies that are operating in telecommunication and technology, C is consumer goods and 
services, O is oil, gas and utilities, M is materials, I is industrials and H is healthcare industry.  
 
 
If we look at the Table 4, we can see that the average percentage of women in the whole 
sample and the Norwegian sample and Finnish sample do not dramatically differ from 
each other. Even though Norway has a gender quota in place, Finland manages to have 
nearly as many women on bard as Norway has. The amount of diversity grows year by 
year and the variation between industries is not big. It might be that the gender quota and 
self-regulation makes the companies choose more women on boards and that is why there 
is no industry that would favor certain gender.  
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6.2. Correlation analysis  
 
The correlation table can be seen in Table 5. Accounting performance (ACC) has a 
negative and a significant relationship with all the diversity variables. Furthermore, the 
firm size and accounting performance has negative and significant correlation. The same 
results can be seen from correlations of market performance (MARK) and gender 
variables and firm size. However, the correlation between diversity variables and market 
performance is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the magnitude of the correlations 
with market performance is not as big as with accounting performance. Which is why it 
is expected that there is no impact between gender diversity and market performance.  
 
Correlation between market performance (Tobin’s Q) and firm size is negative, and the 
magnitude of the correlation is strong. It indicates that companies, which are bigger would 
have lower Tobin’s Q. These finding indicate that companies which have more women 
on their boards would perform worse compared to companies which have less women. 
Therefore, it is expected that regression analysis results are negative as well.  
 
The risk factors are not as correlated with the gender factors as the performance factors 
were. The debt risk is only significantly correlated with percentage of women on board 
of directors and the correlation is positive. It gives an insight that companies with more 
diverse boards are riskier and have higher debt to asset ratio. Furthermore, firm size has 
a negative correlation with debt risk, which indicates that bigger companies have lower 
debt to asset ratio. Board size and market value controls most of the debt risk variable.  
 
Market risk has significant correlation with percentage of women and critical mass 
variables. The correlation is quite strong with the first diversity variable (0,39) and it 
might be that diverse boards would be more volatile. Additionally, critical mass variable 
has a correlation with market risk, but the correlation is nearly non existing (0,07). 
Therefore, it is expected that the magnitude of diversity in regression analysis is not great. 
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Table 5. Table of Correlation 
  Correlation table     
 ACC MARK RISKM RIKSD  PERS MASS  BLAU  BSIZE  FSIZE  VALUE OMX  
ACC 1,00           
 -----            
            
MARK 0,55 1,00          
 (0,00) -----           
            
RISKM -0,33 -0,33 1,00         
 (0,00) (0,00) -----          
            
RISKD  -0,23 -0,31 0,33 1,00        
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) -----         
            
PERS -0,17 -0,05 0,39 0,11 1,00       
 (0,00) (0,35) (0,00) (0,05) -----        
            
MASS  -0,16 -0,08 0,07 0,06 0,83 1,00      
 (0,00) (0,13) (0,00) (0,28) (0,00) -----       
            
BLAU  -0,16 -0,05 0,04 0,08 0,93 0,82 1,00     
 (0,00) (0,34) (0,51) (0,12) (0,00) (0,00) -----      
            
BSIZE  -0,14 -0,15 -0,23 -0,30 0,06 0,13 0,16 1,00    
 (0,01) (0,01) (0,00) (0,00) (0,30) (0,01) (0,00) -----     
            
FSIZE  -0,18 -0,34 -0,05 -0,04 0,40 0,44 0,46 0,48 1,00   
 (0,00) (0,00) (0,37) (0,48) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) -----    
            
VALUE -0,13 -0,23 0,07 0,23 0,08 0,03 0,04 -0,06 0,13 1,00  
 (0,01) (0,00) (0,17) (0,00) (0,13) (0,55) (0,42) (0,29) (0,02) -----   
            
OMX  -0,02 -0,22 0,39 0,07 -0,06 -0,02 -0,06 0,03 0,08 -0,11 1,00 
 
(0,77) (0,00) (0,00) (0,18) (0,30) (0,65) (0,24) (0,60) (0,16) (0,04) ----- 
 Notes: This table shows the correlation table where, ACC is ROA, MARK is Tobin’s Q, RISKM is 
stock volatility, RISKD is debt to asset ratio, PERS is percentage of women on board, MASS is 
critical mass dummy, BLAU is the diversity index, BSIZE is the board size, FSIZE is natural 
logarithm of assets, VALUE is market value of a company,  OMX is the average yearly closing price 
of OMXH and OMXO. 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
6.3. Regressions  
 
In this section all the regressions will be implemented and analyzed. First the Accounting 
performance will be regressed separately with percentage of women, critical mass dummy 
and Blau index. The same will be done to Market performance, Market risk and Debt risk. 
The standard errors will be clustered by period as the robustness test by using the White 
Cross-section method provided by the Eviews to control for serial correlation in the data 
(Eviews 10 Help). The results are provided in the Appendices. 
 
 
6.3.1 Accounting performance 
 
The first hypothesis says that diversity in the board room has a positive impact on 
corporate economic performance. In table 6 the first model considers the percentage of 
women and does it have an impact on Return on Asset. It seems that there is a small and 
positive statistically significant impact of diversity on ROA. However, the impact is quite 
small as the variable of the percentage of women has coefficient 0,0670. The impact in 
statistically significant but that small that just adding women on board cannot improve 
accounting performance. This result gives insight that more diverse boards are found from 
better performing companies.  
 
When we look at the critical mass dummy in Model 2, the companies which exceed the 
30% or more women would be performing worse in Return on Asset compared to those 
who have less women. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant, and the 
magnitude of the critical mass dummy is much stronger than the magnitude of the 
percentage of women. It might be that the Norwegian women quota has had an effect on 
the observed companies and by adding these women to the board it has caused a negative 
effect on accounting performance. This theory will be tackled in the robustness test. 
Another theory could be that there is not a critical mass but there should be a certain 
optimal balance of diversity in the board room in order to get the maximum impact 
(Gordini & Rancati 2017: 87). The optimal balance in this case could be between 0% and 
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30% of diversity as the critical mass dummy had negative impact and the percentage of 
women had a positive impact.  
 
In the third model the diversity index Blau is not statistically significant. This is due to 
the fact that Blau index takes into account the contribution of both magnitude of the 
diversity and the board size. The combined effect seems not to be related to the Return 
on Asset. 
 
Table 6. Regression analysis result for Accounting performance models 1-3 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
C 25,0604 23,4511 25,7973 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
PERS 0,0670   
 (0,0445)   
MASS  -1,7771  
  (0,0309)  
BLAU   -3,9393 
   (0,3120) 
DEBT -9,0435 -9,1076 -9,1772 
 (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) 
BSIZE -3,3079 -3,0766 -3,0278 
 (0,0317) (0,0451) (0,0502) 
FSIZE 0,8355 0,8178 0,9429 
 (0,00093) (0,0110) (0,0032) 
OMX 28,8458 27,9159 27,9362  
(0,0093) (0,0049) (0,00580) 
N 350 350 350 
F-statistic 6,0138 6,0535 5,8217 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
R-squared 0,2881 0,2894 0,2815 
Adjusted R-squared 0,2402 0,2416 0,2331 
Sample type Full Full Full 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table lists the three regression models of Accounting performance (ROA) where, PERS is percentage of 
women on board, MASS is critical mass dummy, BLAU is the diversity index, DEBT is debt ratio, BSIZE is the board 
size, FSIZE is natural logarithm of assets, OMX is the volatility of OMXH and OMXO. 
 
 
In Appendix 1 the robustness test with White Period clustering method is computed. The 
results stay unchanged and the third diversity variable Blau index remain not significant. 
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Therefore, the first hypothesis can be accepted from the first model, but when it comes to 
the second and third model the hypothesis cannot be accepted.  
  
 
6.3.2. Market performance 
 
The second hypothesis argues that diversity does not influence market performance. 
Based on the regression results on Table 7, all the diversity variables are statistically 
significant and have a small and significant impact on Tobin’s Q. The percentage of 
women has again the smallest impact on the market performance. The impact is 
practically non-existent as in the previous regressions for Accounting performance. The 
same conclusion is drawn from the table 7 that diversity cannot impact the performance 
of the company by itself. Furthermore, by conducting the robustness test in Appendix 1 
the results are unchanged as the diversity variables are still significant after clustering the 
standard errors. 
 
If we look at the Model 2 the critical mass dummy seems to have greater magnitude than 
percentage of women. The impact is statistically significant and positive. It is interesting 
to see that 30% or more women on board has negative impact on accounting performance 
and a positive effect on market performance. Could it be that women are influencing on 
certain kind of decision making and for example participate into certain board group and 
therefore can have an impact into one area. 
 
In Model 3 the Blau index is also positive and statistically significant and it might be 
concluded from the Table 7 that diversity has a positive and significant impact on market 
performance. On the other hand, the board size has no effect on the market performance. 
It could be that the amount of people on the decision-making position is not improving 
Tobin’s Q, however it might be that the quality of the decision is the more important 
factor.  
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Table 7. Regression analysis results of Market performance models 1-3 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
C 4,7091 4,7998 4,6718 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
PERS 0,0086   
 (0,0034)   
MASS  0,1536  
  (0,0354)  
BLAU   1,0760 
   (0,0017) 
DEBT -1,4084 -1,3895 -1,4173 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
BSIZE 0,1585 0,1863 0,2088 
 (0,2412) (0,1706) (0,1223) 
FSIZE 0,1992 0,1927 0,1971 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
OMX 2,0373 2,2436 1,8593 
 (0,0203) (0,0107) (0,0355) 
N 350 350 350 
F-statistic 13,2685 12,9107 13,3745 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
R-squared 0,4717 0,4648 0,4736 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4361 0,4288 0,4382 
Sample type Full Full Full 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table lists the three regression models of Market performance (Tobin’s Q) where, PERS is percentage of 
women on board, MASS is critical mass dummy, BLAU is the diversity index, DEBT is debt ratio, BSIZE is the board 
size, FSIZE is natural logarithm of assets, OMX is the volatility of OMXH and OMXO. 
 
 
6.3.3. Market risk 
 
The third hypothesis tackles the question of does gender diversity have an impact on 
volatility and risk. In fact, the hypothesis states based on pervious literature that 
companies with more diverse boards would be less volatile and risky. Looking at table 8 
the Models 1-3 only percentage of women has a statistically significant and positive 
impact on the volatility. Furthermore, the results suggest that the board size does not have 
any relation to the firm risk and volatility.  
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All the other control variables are statistically significant. The results give an insight that 
companies with less debt are more volatile and these characters are seen in companies 
with greater asset value (FSIZE) as the coefficient of firm size is positive. 
 
Looking at the robustness test where the standard errors are clustered the results show 
(Appendix 1) that none of the diversity variables are statistically significant. However, 
the impact is again nearly non-existing as the coefficient is small compared to the 
magnitude of the entire model. Therefore, in practice diversity does not have an impact 
on Market Risk and volatility in this case. More robustness tests will be made in the 
chapter 4.4. 
 
Table 8. Regression analysis results of Market Risk models 1-3. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  
   
C 0,3524 0,3610 0,3271 
 (0,0019) (0,0021) (0,0040) 
PERS 0,0016 
  
 (0,0394) 
  
MASS 
 
0,0247 
 
 
 
(0,2013) 
 
BLAU 
  
0,0595 
 
  
(0,5102) 
DEBT 0,2972 0,3016 0,3020 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,000) 
BSIZE -0,0266 0,0320 -0,0327 
 (0,4523) (0,3715) (0,3635) 
FSIZE -0,0169 -0,0152 0,0137 
 (0,0221) (0,0406) (0,0634) 
OMX 0,8409 0,8868 0,8987 
 (0,0039) (0,0024) (0,0023) 
N 350 350 350 
F-statistic 8,2784 8,0942 8,0099 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
R-squared 
0,3577 0,3526 0,3501 
Adjusted R-squared 0,3145 0,3090 0,3065 
Sample type Full Full Full 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 Notes: This table lists the three regression models of  Market Risk (volatility) where, PERS is percentage of 
women on board, MASS is critical mass dummy, BLAU is the diversity index, DEBT is debt ratio, BSIZE is the 
board size, FSIZE is natural logarithm of assets, OMX is the volatility of OMXH and OMXO.  
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6.3.4. Debt risk 
 
The regression results are reported in Table 9. All the diversity variables have a 
statistically significant impact on debt risk and the impact is positive. Therefore, results 
suggest that gender diversity has a small increasing effect on the debt risk. However, the 
coefficient is so small in Models 1 and 2 that just adding women to the board does not 
make a difference by itself.  
 
Table 9. Regression analysis results for Debt risk Models 1-3. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
C 0,6411 0,6751 0,6407 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
PERS 0,0013 
  
 (0,0881)   
MASS  0,0378 
 
  (0,046)  
BLAU   0,2190 
   (0,0132) 
FSIZE 0,0134 0,0141 0,0148 
 (0,0843) (0,0687) (0,0535) 
BSIZE 0,1790 0,1836 0,1863 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
VALUE 0,0199 0,0204 0,0205 
 
(0,0007) (0,0005) (0,0004) 
TOBIN 0,0809 0,0810 0,0822 
 
(0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
OMX 0,6006 0,6064 0,5513 
 (0,0341) (0,0314) (0,0514) 
N 350 350 350 
F-statistic 5,4000 5,4646 5,5954 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
R-squared 0,2759 0,2783 0,2830 
Adjusted R-squared 
0,2248 0,2273 0,2325 
Sample type Full Full Full 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
  
 Notes: This table lists the three regression models of  Debt Risk (Debt to Asset) where, PERS is percentage of 
women on board, MASS is critical mass dummy, BLAU is the diversity index, DEBT is debt ratio, BSIZE is the 
board size, FSIZE is natural logarithm of assets, VALUE is the market value of a company, TOBIN is Tobin’s 
Q.  
53 
 
The results lead to the conclusion that companies with more diverse boards would be 
riskier and taking slightly more debt than companies with less women. This is 
controversial to the theory and hypothesis four, where women were perceived to be risk 
averse and diverse board was expected to be less risky. 
 
The robustness test is shown in Appendix 1. The results seem to be unchanged after 
clustering the standard errors. Same conclusion can be made from the last regression as 
from the previous models, that the impact of gender diversity is quite small and by just 
adding more women to the board does not have an impact by itself. It is evident that the 
impact of one person is not coming straightly from the gender but also from other 
characteristics that he/she has.  
 
 
6.4. Country specific regression analysis 
 
This section will look at the country specific results for both Finnish and Norwegian data. 
The data is split into two and regressed the same way as in the previous part. Results will 
be analyzed and compared to the initial regression results.  
 
 
6.4.1. Country specific analysis Finland 
 
The regression results in table 10 indicate that the diversity variables would have a 
statistically significant and positive effect on most of the performance and risk variables. 
However, the impact is small and, in most cases, practically non-existing and these results 
follow mostly the initial regression results. It has to be noted that the regression model 
for Market risk is not optimal and the model is not statistically significant when it comes 
to Finnish sample. 
 
In the full sample regression results for Accounting performance the critical mass dummy 
had a negative impact on ROA and Blau index did not have an impact at all. When the 
sample was split the results were positive and significant for Finnish companies. 
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Therefore, it might be that in case of Finnish companies the increasing number of women 
on board has a positive impact on Return on Asset. Furthermore, 30% or more women 
can make an increasing impact.  
 
For market performance and debt risk regressions results are unchanged and all the 
diversity variables are statistically significant and positive. This means that companies 
with more diverse boards would perform slightly better and be a bit riskier.  
 
Table 10. Country specific regression analysis Finland 
Country specific regression analysis Finland 
  
Accounting performance Market performance Market Risk Debt Risk 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
C 21,0366 21,6215 20,5961 3,9008 4,0696 3,8198 0,3737 0,3664 0,3782 0,1166 0,1581 0,1207 
 (0,0474) (0,0368) (0,0555) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,1100) (0,1227) (0,1100) (0,0081) (0,0005) (0,0104) 
PERS 0,0905   0,0282    -0,0015   0,0023   
 (0,0008)   (0,0000)    (0,0467)   (0,0000)   
MASS  1,5659    0,5349    -0,0354    0,0418  
  (0,0028)    (0,0000)    (0,0329)    (0,0079)  
BLAU   8,9291    2,4435   -0,1320    0,1829 
   (0,0001)    (0,0000)   (0,0543)    (0,0013) 
DEBT -15,1244 -14,1683 -14,8009 -2,5329 -2,2517 -2,3864 0,3156 0,3042 0,3083     
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000)     
BSIZE -2,7240 -2,5024 -3,0331 0,0977 0,0369 0,1631 -0,0519 -0,0540 -0,0482 0,0237 0,0153 0,0257 
 (0,0001) (0,0009) (0,0000) (0,2950) (0,7543) (0,0506) (0,0457) (0,0326) (0,0748) (0,1854) (0,4409) (0,1560) 
FSIZE 0,3502 0,2994 0,3309 0,1683 0,1528 0,1606 -0,0091 -0,0099 -0,0095     
 (0,5945) (0,6596) (0,6121) (0,0001) (0,0024) (0,0001) (0,5670) (0,5412) (0,5490)     
OMX -7,2570 -8,1587 -7,0973 0,0211 0,2699 0,0532 0,7954 0,8041 0,7970 0,1053 0,0683 0,0887 
 (0,0692) (0,0335) (0,0755) (0,9692) (0,6219) (0,9251) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,1395) (0,4027) (0,2201) 
TOBIN            0,0516 0,0507 0,0504 
            (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
VALUE            0,0242 0,0237 0,0250 
            (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
R 0,6360 0,6306 0,6386 0,6641 0,6444 0,6566 0,3607 0,3625 0,3038 0,4844 0,4727 0,4743 
Adj R 0,6091 0,6033 0,6119 0,6392 0,6181 0,6312 0,3135 0,3153 0,3129 0,4464 0,4336 0,4355 
F 23,6585 23,1082 23,9234 26,7656 24,5331 25,8843 7,6380 7,6973 7,6225 12,7209 12,1300 12,2168 
 
(0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
Sample 
type 
Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland 
Year 
fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indust. 
fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table lists the three regression models of  Accounting performance, Market performance, Market Risk and Market Risk  where, PERS is percentage of women on 
board, MASS is critical mass dummy, BLAU is the diversity index, DEBT is debt ratio, BSIZE is the board size, FSIZE is natural logarithm of assets, OMX is the volatility of 
OMXH and OMXO, VALUE is the market value of a company, TOBIN is Tobin’s Q.  
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6.4.2. Country specific analysis Norway 
 
The regression analysis for Norwegian data can be seen in table 11. It indicates that for 
Norwegian companies, diversity has opposite effect compared to Finnish companies. All 
the diversity measures are negative and most of them statistically significant. The only 
model which is not statistically significant is model 1 for Market performance. 
 
Table 11. Country specific regression analysis Norway 
Country specific regression analysis Norway 
  
Accounting performance Market performance Market Risk Debt Risk 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
C 28,5628 16,5992 31,7324 3,8772 3,6929 4,1013 0,3387 0,5694 0,3771 1,2860 0,9978 1,3266 
 (0,0008) (0,0788) (0,0002) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0425) (0,0000) (0,0138) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
PERS -0,3073   -0,0054    0,0060   -0,0071   
 (0,0000)   (0,1131)    (0,0002)   (0,0000)   
MASS  -6,1866    -0,1544     0,0947    -0,1073  
  (0,0000)    (0,0554)     (0,0198)    0,0004  
BLAU   -49,6837    -1,3229    0,6797   -0,9644 
   (0,0000)    (0,0003)    (0,0000)   (0,0003) 
DEBT -12,4048 -9,8561 -12,4913 -1,0752 -1,0537 -1,1290 0,4767 0,4145 0,4455    
 (0,0000) (0,0016) (0,0001) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000)    
BSIZE -7,5682 -4,7240 -6,5332 -0,2270 -0,1858 0,2359 0,1405 0,0823 0,1040 -0,3262 -0,2830 -0,2855 
 (0,0010) (0,0358) (0,0079) (0,0540) (0,1383) (0,0506) (0,0089) (0,2528) (0,1823) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
FSIZE 0,3356 0,2523 0,6315 -0,0859 -0,0850 0,0743 -0,0518 -0,0485 -0,0503    
 (0,4236) (0,4902) (0,0841) (0,0175) (0,0142) (0,0304) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000)    
OMX 10,5411 11,8130 10,9352 0,317045 0,3203 0,2927 0,7143 0,6901 0,6877 0,0449 0,0782 0,0699 
 (0,0965) (0,1187) (0,0824) (0,2603) (0,2861) (0,2987) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,6630) (0,3042) (0,4674) 
TOBIN              -0,1035 -0,0923 -0,1128 
              (0,0000) (0,0001) (0,0000) 
VALUE            0,0116 0,0112 0,0164 
            (0,3334) (0,2418) (0,1574) 
R 0,1956 0,1624 0,2159 0,3564 0,3592 0,3684 0,5726 0,5696 0,4062 0,4349 0,3707 0,4168 
Adj R 0,141642 0,1069 0,1633 0,3132 0,3162 0,3261 0,5408 0,5376 0,3664 0,3970 0,3284 0,3776 
F 3,6237 2,8891 4,1029 8,2497 8,3520 8,6921 18,0440 17,8053 10,1928 11,4690 8,7752 10,6480 
 (0,0002) (0,0025) (0,0001) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
Sample 
type 
Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway 
Year 
fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indust. 
fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table lists the three regression models of  Accounting performance, Market performance, Market Risk and Market Risk  where, PERS 
is percentage of women on board, MASS is critical mass dummy, BLAU is the diversity index, DEBT is debt ratio, BSIZE is the board size, FSIZE 
is natural logarithm of assets, OMX is the volatility of OMXH and OMXO, VALUE is the market value of a company, TOBIN is Tobin’s Q.  
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It seems that diverse boards have worse accounting performance and market performance. 
However, these companies have lower Debt risk which is controversial to the results in 
table 10. It could be that the results are country specific and diversity works differently 
in different regions. Also, it is important to mention that the regulatory background varies 
between Norway and Finland. In Norway, which is under quota legislation, companies 
were performing worse when more women were added to the board (Ahrem &Dittmar 
2012: 188). Therefore, it might be that forcing companies to take more women on board 
could have a negative impact on accounting and market performance. However more 
research has to be made in order to determine if this is true.  
 
Looking at the risk of Norwegian companies in table 11 and comparing it to the risk of 
Finnish companies in table 10, it is evident that diversity has an opposite impact in 
different samples. It might be that Norwegian companies are more risk averse when they 
are operating under new jurisdiction of quota women and all women are put into a specific 
sub group where they are only impacting on a specific area of a company. However, more 
research has to be made in order to determine if this explanation applies.  
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7. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The aim of this paper was to investigate if gender diversity has an impact on corporate 
performance and risk. The main idea for the research was drawn from the EU’s gender 
quota proposal which states that there should be both men and women on board of 
directors. However, there was no economic justification for the quota proposal which has 
led to many researches in the field of gender diversity and economics. Even though a lot 
of research has been made based on this topic, there is a gap in the research filed because 
most of the research concentrate only on specific country or specific stock index.  
 
This research concentrates on two countries with different gender acts in place. The first 
country which was introduced was Norway, which is the first country in the world to 
adopt a gender quota and the second country was Finland which uses self-regulatory 
actions to improve gender diversity in the board room. Both samples were regressed 
together and separately to investigate does gender diversity have an impact on risk and 
performance of Norwegian and Finnish companies.  
 
The results for the first part of the analysis were based on the whole sample with both 
Finnish and Norwegian companies. The first regression which answered to the first 
hypothesis, the percentage of women and the critical mass dummy were found to be 
statistically significant. It was surprising that the coefficient of the percentage of women 
was positive and the critical mass dummy was negative. Moreover, it might be that if 
there are more than 30% women on the board the impact is negative, but if less than the 
impact is positive. On the other hand, as the coefficient for the percentage of women in 
positive, the growing number of women should have positive impact on the Accounting 
performance. Gordini & Rancati (2017: 87) argued that there is no correct percentage of 
diversity, but in fact there could be a balance which will determine the right amount of 
diversity in a group. Therefore, more research should be made to investigate if the critical 
mass or balance should be somewhere between 0% and 30%, rather than 30% or more. 
 
The results from the second part of the analysis was based on the second hypothesis of 
the impact to the market performance. All the diversity variables were statistically 
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significant and positive. This indicated that the Market performance could be improved 
by more diverse boards. However, it should be noted that the coefficient in diversity 
variables were so small that by simply adding more women on the board would not make 
a positive impact. But by adding people with knowledge and skill of the task might make 
a difference.  
 
The third regression tackled the third hypothesis of the Market risk and gender diversity. 
Only the variable of percentage of women was statistically significant and positive which 
means that companies with diverse boards would be more volatile and riskier. However, 
the coefficient was so small that any straight forward answers cannot be drawn from the 
regression. In the fourth and last full sample regression of debt risk, all the diversity 
variables were found to be statistically significant and positive, which indicates that 
companies which have more gender diverse boards would have more debt and more 
leveraged. These findings were not in line with the previous literature and stereotypes, 
where women were seen as more risk averse and companies with more women less risky 
(Adams & Funk 2012: 234).  
 
By regressing two countries together the results combine the impact of gender diversity 
in two different countries. This is on the other hand the “average” combined effect and 
the effect of the country and legislation is not seen clearly. Therefore, it was important to 
regress the both samples separately, as it might be that the results are highly country 
related. However, more research is needed to determine if this impact is based on country 
and the fact that women are placed into different board groups inside the board and having 
an impact on the specific area of a company.  
 
The sample was split into two samples, Finnish and Norwegian samples and they were 
regressed the same way as the initial sample. The results were opposite when the country 
changed. For Finnish data the diversity variables were positive across the models, which 
indicate that companies with gender diverse boards were performing better and they were 
riskier. On the other hand, Norwegian companies with more gender diverse boards were 
performing worse and were less risky. Based on the results it seems that the impact of 
gender diversity varies between countries. 
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One of the reasons why the results are country specific is that these two countries have 
different method to improve gender diversity. Norwegian companies might be performing 
worse due to the gender quota as companies have to add women on their boards which 
do not have the skills and merits to act as a director. Similar findings were found in Ahren 
and Dittmar’s (2012) paper. As mentioned in the literature review, they argued that gender 
quota decreased the performance of Norwegian companies and the quota was determined 
to have negative short-term impact. It is interesting that even though the time line in this 
paper is 2007-2016 the results are the same as in the Ahren and Dittmar (2012) research 
paper. It might be that the quota is still affecting the companies after time has passed.  
 
For Finnish companies, diversity had positive impact on performance. This could indicate 
that self-regulatory actions are working, and those women are elected to the board, which 
have the right mindset to contribute to the decision making. However, these companies 
tend to be riskier, which could be due to the fact that women are in committees that have 
an effect to a certain area of the company. As mentioned before this theory should be 
further researched in order to determine if this justification is true.  
 
All in all, the results lead to the conclusion that gender diversity and performance and 
risk are in this case country specific. Therefore, it would not be wise to put a quota which 
would mandate all EU countries to follow a certain diversity percentage. Many countries 
do not have capable women with enough experience to start acting as a director overnight, 
which is why the self-regulatory actions could be the answer to the improvement of the 
gender diversity. However, further research is needed to determine the right way to tackle 
gender diversity in the EU.  
 
 
7.1. Limitations 
 
This research is just a scratch of an ice berg, which is why it has a lot of limitations and 
a lot of further research has to be made to get a full picture of the phenomenon. Firstly, 
the data which was gathered from Thomson Reuters was not perfect and many data points 
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were not in the line with the real data from the annual reports. This research had to rely 
on one source of data due to the limited resources and time.  
 
Secondly, the control variables were chosen based on previous literature, but the model 
was not optimal in most cases. Therefore, for further research better control variables 
should be chosen to get a stronger model. Thirdly, the data set consist only 16 companies 
from Norway and 19 companies from Finland. This data set is relatively small and could 
be greater if there were more data sources at hand. However, at this point the research 
had to rely on the Thomson Reuters database only. By having more companies in the 
research, the regression could be more reliable, and it would tell a better story.  
 
Fourthly, the effect of the industries was controlled by dummy variables, but as mentioned 
in the literature review some of the papers found different impact on performance when 
the results were analyzed within a certain industry. Further research could focus on the 
effect of the industry. Fifthly, the impact of the committee where a specific women 
director was sitting was not analyzed. This variable could have led to a stronger 
argumentation and better results as it was assumed that the risk of the companies and 
especially between countries depends on in which area of these companies the director is 
influencing on.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1. Regression robustness test with White cross-section method 
 
Robustness test for Accounting performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
     
C 25,0604 23,4511 25,7973 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
PERS 0,0700   
 (0,0369)   
MASS  -1,7771  
  (0,0218)  
BLAU   -3,9393 
   (0,1114) 
DEBT -9,0435 -9,1076 -9,1772 
 (0,0002) (0,0001) (0,0002) 
BSIZE -3,307899 -3,0765 -3,0278 
 (0,0026) (0,0038) (0,0069) 
FSIZE 0,8355 0,8176 0,9428 
 (0,0053) (0,0052) (0,0008) 
OMX 28,8459 27,9160 27,9362 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
N 350 350 350 
F-statistic 6,0138 6,0535 5,8219 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
R-squared 0,2881 0,2894 0,2814 
Adjusted R-squared 0,2402 0,2416 0,2331 
Sample type Full Full Full 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
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Robustness test for Market performance 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
     
C 4,7091 4,7998 4,6718 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
PERS 0,0086   
 (0,0004)   
MASS  0,1536  
  (0,0746)  
BLAU   -1,4173 
   (0,0000) 
DEBT -1,4084 -1,3895 -1,4173 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
BSIZE 0,1585 0,1863 0,2088 
 (0,0096) (0,0037) (0,0012) 
FSIZE 0,1992 0,1927 0,1971 
 (0,0096) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
OMX 2,0373 2,2436 1,8593 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
N 350 350 350 
F-statistic 6,0138 6,0535 5,8219 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
R-squared 13,2685 12,9107 13,3745 
Adjusted R-squared 0,4361 0,4288 0,4382 
Sample type Full Full Full 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
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Robustness test for Market Risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
     
C 0,3524 0,3613 0,3270 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
PERS 0,0016   
 (0,1470)   
MASS  0,0247  
  (0,3001)  
BLAU   0,0596 
   (0,4664) 
DEBT 0,2972 0,3026 0,3020 
 (0,0002) (0,0002) (0,0002) 
BSIZE -0,0269 -0,0320 -0,0327 
 (0,3902) (0,3545) (0,3479) 
FSIZE -0,017 -0,0013 -0,0137 
 (0,0003) (0,0025) (0,0036) 
OMX 0,8409 0,8868 0,8987 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
N 350 350 350 
F-statistic 8,2784 8,0940 8,1000 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
R-squared 0,3577 0,3526 0,3501 
Adjusted R-squared 0,3145 0,3090 0,3065 
Sample type Full Full Full 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
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Robustness test for Debt Risk 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
     
C 0,6411 0,6751 0,6407 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
PERS 0,0013   
 (0,0604)   
MASS  0,0378  
  (0,0790)  
BLAU   0,2190 
   (0,0070) 
BSIZE 0,1790 0,1836 0,1863 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
FSIZE 0,0134 0,0141 0,0148 
 (0,0107) (0,0082) (0,0049) 
VALUE 0,019942 0,020442 0,020483 
 
(0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
TOBIN 0,0809 0,0810 0,0822 
 
(0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
N 350 350 350 
F-statistic 5,4000 5,4646 5,5954 
 (0,0000) (0,0000) (0,0000) 
R-squared 0,2759 0,2783 0,2830 
Adjusted R-squared 0,2248 0,2273 0,2325 
Sample type Full Full Full 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
